The Impersonal Enunciation, or the Site of Film (In the Margin of Recent Works on Enunciation in Cinema)

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Christian Metz

NOT ONLY are there different conceptions of enunciation, but the concept itself contains several distinct ideas (the latter probably contributing to the former). Two of those ideas have been accurately stated in Greimas and Courtés' *Dictionary*:[1] enunciation is a *production*; and it is also a transition, from a virtual instance (such as the code) to a real instance. There is also a third idea, which, in fact, is the first one in Benveniste and Jakobson and, in the narratological field, in Gérard Genette.[2]

What is meant by the word "enunciation" is the presence, at both ends of the utterance,[3] of two human persons, or, rather, two *subjects* (it has to be kept in mind that for Benveniste the pair JE/TU [I/ YOU] defines the "correlation of subjectivity"). Of course, narratology keeps telling us that enunciator and addressee are abstract and structural instances, "places"; that it would be somehow silly to mistake them for the empirical enunciator and addressee (author, reader . . .); that enunciation is theoretically and practically different from *communication,* and so on. These ritual incantations do not have to be taken literally, at least not consistently. If narrator and author are doubtless usually differentiated (to take only this example), the locations of enunciation itself—enunciation being, supposedly, purely textual—are nevertheless usually perceived as persons of some kind. To think of these locations, clearly to figure them out, is only possible, one must admit, through *instances of incarnation.* On the other hand, these instances of incarnation are supposed to occupy the place of the locations of enunciation in the transmission process: thus, if someone tells me about the addressee,

in order to understand what I am told, I have to think of the spectator, who is going to cast himself (in theory, or by miracle) in the role of the "addressee."

However, this does not mean that the features of its instances of incarnation have to be transferred onto the enunciative apparatus, as is done by those narratologists who, after defining some Ideal Reader (implied, immanent, and so on), describe the detail of his reactions in the vocabulary of human and fictional psychology. Moreover, terms such as *enunciator* and *addressee* bear hardly avoidable, and—in some cases as we will see—quite troublesome, anthropomorphic connotations, especially in film where everything depends on machines. If what is meant is the physical inscription of enunciation, using things' names would be more appropriate. I would suggest "source (or origin) of the enunciation" and "enunciative target (or destination)." (The human subject reappears when someone comes to *occupy* the source or the target.) A long time ago, Albert Laffay accurately said that one could find in the heart of all films, with their "ultraphotographic interventions" and many manipulations, a "virtual linguistic source," an "image exhibitor," a "fictitious person" (note the word fictitious), a "master of ceremonies," a "grand picture-maker," and, therefore, eventually, an "imageless structure" (this latter remark is exceptionally accurate).[4]

The instances of incarnation do not match the enunciative positions in a regular homological way. One would simply expect the spectator, comically called "the real spectator" (that is, the spectator *tout court*) to be on the side of the target. In fact, he occupies both the source, in that he can be identified with the camera, and the target, in that the film watches him. This second, backwards, movement has been remarkably described by Marc Vernet: the third fictitious dimension of the screen creates a point of perspective that is directed toward us, "an anonymous reflexive look, which breaks and launches again the dual relationship between the spectator and the image."[5] The spectator would then be both an I and a YOU. This proposition, formulated in those terms, does not make much sense: this is a first indication of the inconveniences encountered in the use of personal pronouns. Personal pronouns can only lead toward *a deictic conception of enunciation in cinema,* which in my opinion is not suitable to the realities of film. This is, however, the most common theory in the terrain of cinema. It usually remains implicit, even more or less unconscious. It appears again, aware of itself for the first time, and vigorously articulated, in the work of Francesco Casetti, who is so far the best analyst of cinematographic enunciation.[6] Casetti summarizes the main enunciative configurations, which he identifies

by their "executive hyperphrases." Taken together, these hyper-phrases constitute some kind of *deictic formulary.* Thus, for the look at the camera: "I (= enunciator) and HE or SHE (= character) look at YOU (= addressee)," and so on and so forth for all other significant "forms" outlined by enunciation.

However, is an I that cannot become a YOU still an I? You may ask a psychoanalyst, whose answer is quite predictable, or a linguist, for whom the reversibility of the first two persons is an essential feature of their very definition.

The highest degree of this reversibility occurs in *oral exchange.* Oral exchange, as opposed to "story," is Benveniste's prototypical form of "discourse." According to the same author, oral exchange is also the starting point of the whole theory of enunciation.[7] In a conversation, it seems that you can see or touch both the source and the target of enunciation (which in fact shy away from this contact, because they are nothing but grammatical pronouns). Source and target are, once again, mistaken for their instances of incar-nation, for the two talking persons: what is seen as the source of enunciation is *another simultaneous utterance,* the mimico-gestual ut-terance produced by the same person, that is, by the speaker (hence the confusion). But still, the reversibility of the enunciative poles reaches its highest degree in oral exchange: the instances of incar-nation are real human bodies that combine in a remarkable way two modes of presence: presence to each other, and presence right there at the very moment of their utterance (as opposed to written exchange, to the message on the answering machine, and so on, and above all to literature, cinema, painting). The reactions of the addressee might gradually modify and reprogram the words spoken by the enunciator, because of the parallel and logically anterior exchange between the listener and the speaker. Enunciation theory was built largely upon situations that are exceptional because of their structural features (but very common in everyday life).

The reversibility of the persons is found at a lesser degree in *written dialogues,* transcriptions, and other "reported speeches." Ben-veniste,[8] as well as literary narratology,[9] paid attention to this phe-nomenon. Here, there is no more real feedback of the target upon the source, but (written) utterances that mimic other (oral) utterances and also mimic this retroaction. This imitation is made possible by the identity of the global code, that is the language, and especially by the identity of deictic terms, which in general have similar written and oral forms, increasing the confusion.

Pragmatics, to whom nothing human is alien, must have dealt

with many more intermediate cases. For instance, the I in an official discourse, which nobody is supposed to answer, although the speaker is well known by everyone; or, again, the I in a pamphlet bearing a signature, and so on. Step by step, we reach the "story," in which the reversibility of the persons disappears, since theoretically, only the third person is used. "Enunciation in the story," to use another formula by Benveniste,[10] does not have markers. Casetti will argue that in certain cases, enunciation is "assumed," implied by the mere presence of an utterance, or, in fiction, "diegeticized." (But at the other end of the variation spectrum, enunciation itself can be *uttered* [enunciated].)[11]

Before proceeding any further, a few basic reminders about the true deictics that are found in articulated language: I shall give the example of the French or English language. Since the exact list of deictics changes according to different linguists, I shall abide by the most common—namely, personal, possessive, and demonstrative pronouns,[12] time and location adverbs, verb tenses. We should not forget that the category of deictics overlaps to a great extent that of anaphorics; I shall provisionally use the term index to mean both deictics and anaphorics.

A first distinction can be made between "dédoublés" and "simple" indexes. The first ones have differentiated forms in the discourse and in the story: "Yesterday/the previous day," and so on. ("Yesterday" is a deictic form, while "the previous day" is anaphoric; the second does not refer anymore to a circumstance of the enunciation but to a piece of information already enclosed in the utterance.) Other indexes, however, keep the same form in story and discourse— personal and possessive pronouns of the third person and all demonstratives: "this" is what you point at with your finger, as well as what points at the previous sentence. The distinction between "unfolded" and other indexes is, of course, purposeless when applied to terms used only in discourse (personal and possessive pronouns of the first two persons), or only in "story," such as the past perfect and the anterior past; the question of form doubling arises only for terms with two functions.

A second significant distinction can be made between deictics having *different signifiers for the same referent* according to the circumstances of enunciation, and deictics with only one signifier. In a conversation Mr. Durand is called I when he speaks, but YOU when Dupont talks to him; 18 July is called "tomorrow" if you speak on the seventeenth, but "yesterday" if you speak on the

nineteenth, and so on. This latter category matches approximately
what language philosophers call the "token reflexives"[13]: the specific
token of each enunciation is "reflected," according to these philos-
ophers' own terms, even in the literal meaning of the utterance. In
order to know what location the word *here* means, you have to know
where the sentence has been uttered at that time. This is the group
of the deictics *par excellence* (and maybe the only one),[14] both because
this group has a very special mechanism of reference and because
it contains the keywords *I* and *YOU* (which are also the words Casetti
mentions). What is specific to this group is that it provides us with
information on enunciation through enunciation itself; this group
also is dependent on certain changes in reality, as opposed to the
book or the film. Of course, personal and possessive pronouns of
the first two persons belong to this group; so does the verbal triad
present/past/future used to designate the same date according to
the time of the speech; as well as the adverbs "yesterday/today/
tomorrow," "here/there"—designating the same place according to
whether you are close or distant—left/right,[15] and so on. These
words which undergo changes differ from other words whose sig-
nifier does not change for a unique referent, even if the conditions
of enunciation vary, that is if the sentence is uttered later, somewhere
else, by someone else, and so on, and for the atemporal present
("The earth is round"), and for all demonstratives except those
organized in pairs, such as close/distant, *this one/that one*.

   The only aim of this brief presentation was to emphasize the
extreme precision of the deictic dispositive, even when it is tran-
scribed in the simplest manner. The fact that all those structures
are found in the dialogues of a talking movie is not surprising,
since speeches have been recorded "en bloc"; the same comment
can be made about the dialogues of a novel, since the mimicking
transcription I have mentioned is always possible. However, is it a
good idea—since we just took the (incomplete) measure of the
structural constraints generated by this I, *constraints that also build
its meaning*—to call this I the source of enunciation of a film or a
novel taken as a whole, or the source of any other noninteractive
discourse, which is completed before it is presented and does not
give either to enunciation, nor to the reader-spectator any possibility
for modifying it, other than—and this is a purely exterior change—
to close the book or turn the television off? Gianfranco Bettetini
gives those kinds of discourses—which include the majority of clas-
sical texts—the quite accurate name of "monodirectional," which I
shall keep.[16]

In addition, among the discourses prepared in advance which do not allow changes, a distinction should be made between linguistic discourses, such as literary narration, and audiovisual ones. In the latter, the speeches—which can be very close to actual everyday exchanges—must deal, however, with the Image. They do not carry the message alone; the body of the text partly escapes them. In a novel, nothing is speech, everything becomes writing, but the language is sovereign and the idiom unchanged (the text's idiom is that *spoken* by the characters and the readers). The discourse is sprinkled with deictics (mimicked deictics, as we have seen) as well as with anaphorics, especially in passages of "story." Deictics and anaphorics are often expressed by the same word (such as *this*), so that the general impression remains. The spontaneous perception of the difference between story and discourse is often blurred by the anaphoro-deictic terms, for if the analysis did not go beyond these terms, discourse would become story without any change in the signifiers, by a one notch functional commutation, the role of the situation being mechanically replaced by the role of the context. (In pragmatic terms, one could say that the cotext has, as accurately as possible, taken the place of the context.) In addition, in writing, the anaphor is less distant from the deixis, since the latter operates on "situations" which are themselves pure products of the utterance. In discourse, in the novel's dialogues, the character will be able to talk of *this dog,* if we know from the book that there is a dog in the room right now; in "story," the narrator of the same novel will be able to say "this dog" if he refers to the preceding phrase where we learned that there was a dog in the room at this point: reconstituted deixis there, ordinary anaphor here.

In short, the story can assume the appearance of discourse, or remind us of some vaguely intermediate form. On the other hand—since things are connected but distinct—the written text always gives the impression of an enunciative presence to various degrees: this is because the text keeps in itself something from the deictic enunciation, the one whose use is most familiar to us. (The linguistic theory of enunciation—and this is not a coincidence—started as a theory of deictics.) Same remarks, *a fortiori,* for the "oral text," fully oral, as sometimes on the radio.

"If it speaks [ça parle], it means someone is speaking": this is the general impression, even about a book. But the cinematic equivalent of this inner and immediate belief is far from certain. "If they are images to be seen, this means someone arranged them": not everyone feels it clearly. The spectator spontaneously attributes the dialogues in the film to an enclosed, second-level instance; and he attributes

the speeches of a potential off-narrator, or anonymous commentator, who pretends to be almighty, to an enunciative position, yet still unfocused and vague, or somehow blurred, or at least veiled by the image (on this subject, see André Gaudreault's remarks which seem to me very accurate[17]). The spectator is never able to pretend that the first, authentic enunciation does not come from the "Grand Imager" mentioned by Albert Laffay, who orders images and even voices (*and the voices as images*), whose globally extralinguistic enterprise never gives the clear impression of a specialized, personalized, enunciative presence. But in most cases, this spectator does not think of the "Imager." On the other hand, he does not, of course, believe that things reveal themselves: he simply *sees images*. Although he supports (as I do) a theory of cinematic enunciation, André Gardies has a significant moment of doubt and declares that the notion of cinematic enunciation might only be an anthropomorphic metaphor.[18] André Gaudreault notes that a linguistic utterance is automatically ascribed to a precise person, whether or not this person can be identified.[19] He also notes that this certainty begins to shake as soon as nonverbal utterances are concerned. One has to keep in mind that the word *to utter* [énoncer], in common French, means only the act of speaking or writing (compare the expression "l'énoncé du problème" [the utterance, the formulation of the problem]). This expresses the almost universal belief that the only true language is the linguistic language. Moreover, when David Bordwell condemns the very notion of enunciation in film studies, he uses a very similar argument, the nonlinguistic nature of the object.[20] One could say the same thing about Gérard Genette's statements that film could not, properly speaking, be a narration, because it is not a linguistic being.[21]

People who think that the expression "cinematic enunciation" has any meaning should not ignore this point, which is indeed very strong. It compels us to make an important conversion: to conceive of an enunciative apparatus that would not be essentially deictic (and therefore anthropomorphic), or *personal* (as are the pronouns that are called *personal*), and that would not too closely imitate this or that linguistic device, since linguistic inspiration works better from a distance. "Often, indeed," as Pierre Sorlin puts it, "the film indicates its relationship with the public by emphasizing that it is a film (an object fabricated from shot images and taped sounds), without involving the slightest trace of subjectivity." He adds: "In many films, the marks of enunciation do not refer to any delegated subject."[22] In film, when enunciation is indicated in the utterance, it is not, or not essentially, by deictic imprints, but by *reflexive*

constructions (François Jost had already expressed a very similar idea in an article[23]): the film talks to us about itself, about cinema, or about the position of the spectator.[24] It is at this moment that the kind of "unfolding" of the utterance appears, which in all theories constitutes the condition without which one can not speak of enunciation. The deictic unfolding—to be at the same time (and fictitiously if necessary) inside and outside—is not the only possible one. The metafilmic (metadiscursive) splitting, which is internal, may also support a complete instance of enunciation, all by itself if necessary. The reflexive return, as I shall attempt to demonstrate, might take many forms, which are frequent in films and numerous enough to cover the current inventory of enunciative positions: film in the film, *off*-address, *in*-address, subjective image, shot/reverse shot, flashback, and so on. The example of cinema (and many others, probably) invites us to broaden our idea of enunciation, and this time it is film theory that might, in turn, have some effect on general semiology and linguistics. It is not surprising that the various kinds of existing discourses, which are so diverse, offer diverse enunciation devices; and it would even be trivial to mention it if enunciation was not too automatically connected with deixis by some people. For what is enunciation basically? It is not necessarily, nor always, "I-HERE-NOW"; it is, more generally speaking, the ability some utterances have to fold up in some places, to appear here and there as in relief, to lose this thin layer of themselves that carries a few engraved indications *of another nature* (or another level), regarding the production and not the product, or rather, involved in the product by the other end. Enunciation is the semiologic act by which some parts of a text talk to us about this text as an act. However, resorting to the complicated and quasi-inimitable mechanism of the deixis is not a necessity. The possible markers of enunciation are very diverse. In orchestral music, for instance, one marker is the characteristic sonority: when the oboe comes in, it does not only play its phrase, it makes itself recognizable as oboe; the musical message did split into two layers of information, each having a different status. In a film, if characters watch something from a window, they reproduce my own situation as a spectator and remind me both of the nature of what is going on—a film projection, a vision in a rectangle—and the part I am playing in it. But the textual construction which reminded me of it is meta-filmic, it is not deictic; or rather, in this example, the textual construction is meta-cinematographic, since the rectangle of the screen is typical of the film as such. In a more general way, as François Jost and Jean-Paul Simon rightly put it,[25] cinema does not have a closed list of enunciative signs, but it uses

any sign (as in my example of the window) in an enunciative manner, so that the sign can be removed from the diegesis and immediately come back to it. The *construction* will have, for an instant, assumed an enunciative value.

Gianfranco Bettetini correctly states that the film, despite its spoken words, is always on the side of the written, never on that of the oral (*CA* 106). It is true at least on one point, but a capital point: enunciator and addressee—at the global level of the work, not in inserted dialogues—do not exchange their marks along the way; and the addressee does not change by his reactions either the propositions or the proposal of the enunciator. This remains true, even when the canonical markers of enunciation unmistakably appear (for this happens), such as extra-diegetic commentaries saying "You" to the public: this "You" will never be able to respond. (Reciprocally, this example reminds us that deictics, even thus weakened, are not without any function in cinematographic enunciation.) Dominique Chateau notes that cinema instigates a "discontinuous communi-cation"[26]: the two poles of enunciation, enunciator and addressee, cannot be exchanged, nor can they touch each other; transmission is split in two moments, recording (filming) and projection, separated by several technological and commercial intermediate steps. Marc Vernet, for his part, in a fine passage, describes the camera-gaze as the symbol of the encounter between reality and spectator:[27] this encounter is always desired, always missed, sometimes approached; it constitutes the fundamentals of film.

I come back to Bettetini. In the remarkable book he has devoted to these problems, *La Conversazione audiovisiva,* his position is both very rigorous and paradoxical. He describes film as "conversation"— hence the book's title—a conversation between a simulacrum of the enunciator and a simulacrum of the addressee, both within the text, constituents of the enunciation apparatus; they mime an exchange and prepare for the possibility of later genuine interactions. The first paradox lies in Bettetini's choice of conversation as a metaphor for types of discourses which are radically different; the second paradox is that the book, which does not lack subtlety, insists on this difference: film is not interactive, it does not accept any response, the conversation of the books is imaginary, fantasmic so to speak. I shall not follow the way traced by the author, but it is not without appeal.

Film does not contain any deictic equivalents, with the exception, of course, of spoken words and written quotes. With the exception

too, of one sort of global and permanent deictic—a very atypical
one, to tell the truth—an actualizing and vaguely demonstrative
"*There is*" [Voici],[28] which is always tacit and always present and, in
addition, proper to images rather than to film. (The image of an
object *presents* this object, it contains some kind of designative ele-
ments that are little differentiated.) Otherwise, moving and sounding
photographs have nothing similar to verb tenses, personal or pos-
sessive pronouns, "there" or "the day after tomorrow." It could be
misleading, since the film is able to express space and time rela-
tionships of some kind, but only anaphorically, within the film itself,
between its different parts, and not between the film and someone
or something else. An appropriated construct of images might tell
us "The next day . . ." (one evokes the night in between, makes
clear that there was only one night, and so on), but this construct
cannot tell us "Tomorrow"—that is, one day after the day you watch
this film. In a more general way, there always will be an important
difference between textual arrangements that *evoke* the author's or
spectator's figure, and words like I or YOU, that *designate* explicitly
the corresponding persons in a conversation.

As Francesco Casetti puts it without elaborating: despite the scep-
ticism of most commentators, the film could really resort to a certain
number of deictic configurations (*YY* 82). He mentions only two of
them. The first ones are the technical traces, voluntary or not, which
reveal the work on image and sound and remain in the final reel:
that is, I'll grant, a mark of enunciation, but a typically metafilmic
one; it is a fragment of secondary discourse, which tells us about
discourse; it is in no way deictic, unless we call deictic all that shows
or indicates something to us. The film credits, according to the
author, also belong to the deixis. One could, of course, resort to
my "metadiscursive argument" as soon as one talks about film credits.
Moreover, the film credits are entirely carried by the language, by
the written and sometimes spoken language. However, it is true
that the film credits inform us, if not about the reality of the
production work, at least about the coworkers' and the author's
name, sometimes about the shooting place, most of the time about
the approximate date of the film. But this information is not given
to us deictically. If in 1988 I watch a film that came out that same
year, its credits do not tell me "shot this year," but they bear (when
they do) the date *1988,* which can be understood by everyone
without specific information about the circumstances of enunciation.
Deictic mechanisms are precisely what is to be avoided here, since
deictics, taken in their purest form (variable signifier for a unique
referent), would compel one to alter the reel again and again. (I

hope I will be forgiven this caricatural hypothesis and these quite
trivial reminders, aimed to react against the abusive use of the
figurative or expanded sense.)

About film credits, Casetti recalls the still famous final sentence
in *The Magnificent Ambersons,* "My name is Orson Welles," spoken
by Orson Welles himself (*DS* 42–43). The reflexivity appears clear.
It is combined, this time, with an authentic deixis: had the same
statement been said by the R. K. O. representative, we would have
heard, "His name is Orson Welles" (I indeed go on making absurd
suppositions). The signifier would have changed, not the referent.
The film admirably integrates the possessive to the general construct:
it is the role of Orson Welles's voice, which "takes up" the story's
narrative voice and magistrally saturates the last minutes of the reel.
By nature, this deictic construct is not cinematographic but purely
linguistic; it contributes as such to the film and finds its effectiveness
in the film itself.

The "system" suggested by Francesco Casetti—since it is a system,
and of great intellectual strength—rests entirely on cardinal points,
which Casetti sees as the enunciative configurations in film, or as
the *coordinates,* to use his own term, of cinematic enunciation. He
is not unaware, of course, that film presents many other enunciative
positions, such as the various forms of subjective framing studied
in remarkable detail by Edward Branigan.[29] In Casetti, these various
framings would probably be considered as relevant variants or
derived cases. For his objective is different: it is deliberately synoptic
and general, as in an aerial photograph. On more than one point,
he takes up Bettetini's position, but he wants to be more "technical."
He is the first to offer elements of formalization for the whole
enunciative apparatus of film in its main outlines. Therefore, it is
not a coincidence that I am reacting to his text.

If you put aside two figures which are studied separately in the
book (see *DS* 104 and *passim*), the flashback and the film in the
film—other combinations of the same terms which I am getting to
now—you are confronted with the following grid (see *YY* 89–91;
DS 60–64): (1) *So-called objective shots* ("nobody's shots" in the Anglo-
Saxon tradition); the formula is: I (enunciator) and YOU (addressee),
we watch IT (the utterance, character, film). (2) *Interpellations* (=
camera-looks and various addresses): I and HE, we watch YOU,
who are then supposed to watch. (3) *So-called subjective shots*: YOU
and HE see what I show you. (4) *"Unreal objective shots"* (= author's
rare angles, which cannot be ascribed to a character, as well as
similar constructions): "As if YOU were I."

The second case, interpellation, has a variant in which the enunciator does not assume a character's point of view, but the point of view of the whole scene, as when there are screens in the screen, mirrors, windows, folding screens, and so on (this connection seems a little loose to me); the formula is: "THIS is for YOU, it is a film, that is ME." The emergence of a reflexive idea, "it is film," is to be noted in a general conception dominated by deictics. This phenomenon is much stronger than the author believes. He first states that personal pronouns will be for him "simple equivalents of indicative nature" (*YY* 88); but later personal pronouns are the only elements to be part of his formula, until the reader discovers that they were barely metaphorical, and that their function was more than just indicative: Casetti indeed tells us toward the end: "[In enunciation] someone appropriates a language . . . ; persons are being articulated (appropriation allows the distinction between an I, a YOU, a HE), etc." (*DS* 142): we deal here with (nearly) true personal pronouns. I shall leave aside other aspects of the book; Casetti's concerns are noticeably broader.

Any conception of enunciation that is influenced too much by deixis contains, as soon as the analysis of spoken exchanges is left behind, three main risks: anthropomorphism, artificial use of linguistic concepts, and transformation of enunciation into communication (= "real," extra-textual relationships). Casetti himself does not often yield to those temptations; he warns us against them, but in the theoretical field the risk remains ("the risk," in the singular, because the three are one and cannot be dissociated).

First of all, when a film is being shown, there is in general one spectator (at least): the instance of incarnation of the target is present. But the instances of incarnation of the source—the filmmaker, or the production team—are, most of the time, absent. Bettetini grants some importance to this disymmetry (*CA* 99, 100). For this dissymmetry causes the true tête-à-tête to be distorted with regard to the so-called persons of the language: the tête-à-tête does not happen between an enunciator and an addressee, but between an enunciator and an utterance, between a spectator and a *film*, that is, between a YOU and a S/HE, distributed thus. The meaning of this YOU and this HE is blurred, since the only human subject that is right there and able to say I is precisely the YOU. It is also the common feeling, except in the specialized milieu of filmmakers, that the "subject" is the spectator; books about psychoanalytic semiology, which deal at length with the "spectator subject," certainly reflect this impression.

For Casetti, the enunciative poles are roles; same term in Branigan (see, for instance, *PV* 40). These roles will be invested by bodies later on (for instance *DS* 53; *YY* 78, 84), during the actual transmission; same term in Bettetini (*CA* 110).[30] The formula is beautiful and points at something essential. However, where the enunciator is concerned, there is no body. And since it is true that roles (or their equivalents in another theoretical frame) call for an incarnation—the nature of this call still remains enigmatic—the "enunciator" is incarnated in the only available body, the body of the text, that is, a *thing*, which will never be an I, which is not in charge of any exchange with some YOU, but which is a source of images and sounds, and nothing else. *The film is the enunciator,* the film as a source, acting as such, *oriented* as such, the film as activity. This is how people think: what the spectator faces, what he has to deal with, is the film. Casetti's idea, that a body would be needed for the enunciator as well as for the addressee, is inspired by the first two persons of the verb in languages.

Not being an I, the source of enunciation does not produce a YOU answering the I; neither does the source produce a HE on the screen. The utterance, the film itself, the character, and so on, do not have the features of a HE. HE is the "non-person" of Benveniste, the absent person: the film is not absent. HE, especially, is the absent one, inasmuch as two present persons, "I" and "YOU," talk about him: the film, far from being an absent instance stuck between two present ones, would resemble rather a present instance stuck between two absent ones, the author, who disappears after the fabrication, and the spectator, who is present but does not manifest his presence in any respect.

Another difficulty is connected with "watching" or "seeing," which assumes great importance, when cinema is at stake. Casetti sometimes uses these verbs with the enunciator as a subject, I; thus, "I and You, we are watching it," as far as objective framing is concerned. "I" can only designate the body or the role of the filmmaker. If it is the filmmaker himself (the body), he does not watch, he has watched (which is still not entirely accurate: he has filmed, and, therefore, watched; the "utterer" [émetteur] does not watch his film; he makes it). If this is the role of the filmmaker, as is most likely the case, one does not understand either how this ideal figure, which is, so to speak, upstream and exists before the film, can watch anything: from the source, nothing either watches or sees, the source produces, expands, *shows.* The parallelism between the enunciator (in the example of objective framing) and the addressee who sees, is artificially produced by deictic symmetries. The influence of the

deictic model subtly distorts in various points this brand new system that has brought much to the terrain. For instance, the idea of the spectator as *interlocutor* (see *DS* 15)—an idea already familiar in textual semiotics—seems to me without any useful provocation as soon as the term is deprived of what constitutes its definition, the idea of immediate interaction. Moreover, if the film spectator is an *interlocutor,* what will users of truly interactive media that already exist be called? Scientific words are not exempted from keeping a minimal conformity with common language; they should at least not contradict it.

In order to designate what supports the target and the source, I prefer to use a vague and cautious formula, "instances of incarnation." For if it is true that source and target, which are basically only text orientations of the text, call for *external* support, this support is not *real* because of that. Or at least it is real only, and there only, with the "empirical" spectator or author as they say— in studies which are themselves empirical and which derive from inquiries, questionnaires, and organized experimental screenings, and so on. Research about enunciation does not make use of such methods; it is most of the time based on film analysis and remains "internal." However it constantly needs to *visualize a Figure of the Spectator.* Books on this subject all say that camera, for instance, is directed toward the spectator (or toward the addressee, since the ideality of the former sometimes makes the alleged distinction impossible), that the spectator looks toward the left of the picture, that he is connected with this character rather than that, and so on. In one word, the two "real" poles, sender and receiver, are in themselves imaginary, and, however, necessary as mental support for the film analysis. Necessary and of a very legitimate use, if only we are clearly aware that this "real" is nothing but the imagination of the analyst: the analyst, indeed, manages to construct his "spectator" and "author" on the basis of two information flows, the progression of the film, and the reactions of the individual (as well as the real . . .) spectator he himself is. In addition, this spectator will probably think that such brusque and unmotivated camera motion probably reflects an "author's intention." And this is the way things are in the film, or, at least, there is no other way to construct the film; but the true intention of Mr. X, filmmaker, is not known to anyone. As Edward Branigan has well expressed it, the work does not provide *any context* (see *PV* 40)—no "frame"[31] in this perspective—as to where we put the figure of the author; in order to read a text, we are compelled gradually to make up an imaginary

author, exactly as the author, in order to compose this text, could not help constructing an imaginary reader (see *PV* 39). Those remarks seem essential to me, as does Bettetini's insistence on the fantasmic nature of the protagonists in the "audiovisual conversation" (see *CA* 110, 120).

In very beautiful pages on visual "interpellation," Francesco Casetti declares that the place of the addressee, in the gaze at the camera, is the empty space in front of the screen, a space created by this blind look, only outshot that will never become a shot (see *YY* 79; *DS* 65, 73): acute analysis of a cinematic configuration which, however, cannot preclude (and refrains from doing so) the spectators' actual reaction, although the spectators are supposedly represented by this addressee, whose place is indicated to us. We can be sure that the major part of the audience has a far less subtle idea (or no idea at all) about the camera-gaze, and that its "instinctive," affective, and visual responses vary considerably according to individuals and time. For one single film image there certainly is no point on the screen (or even around the screen) that cannot become the "place" of one or more spectators. Hence the futility of some empirical investigations which choose between interchangeable or indifferent alternatives.

Textual analysis, even when enunciative, remains textual analysis. If you want information about audiences and filmmakers, you have to go and get them on the spot. You cannot dispense with experimenting or collecting facts. It is of no use to pretend with all the required discretion that knowledge of the enunciator and the addressee would give us at least probabilities or general frames to understand the author's intentions and the spectator's reactions. For these forecasts are so general that no empirical analysis would take them into account and that they could prove to be wrong for any given spectator, even if they express a partial tendency common to everyone. The reason why is that you deal with two heterogeneous orders of reality, a text (that is, I repeat, a thing) and persons; many different persons and a unique text. Pragmatics, at least when it adheres to the text, has to accept this limitation, which it resents at times even though there is nothing there to be ashamed of. The spectator is exposed to multiple influences that were, of course, absent from cinematic prediction; it is therefore not contradictory to note that the film has "positioned" the addressee on the right side of the screen and that this spectator has placed his gaze to the left (Bettetini's theory devotes much space to these disparities[32]). Enunciative analyses, for all these reasons, seem to keep all their usefulness and autonomy. Their "realistic" pretensions are rather

voluntary illusions of the moment and are explicitly contradicted soon afterwards. Francesco Casetti declares, for instance, that the YOU allows the interface between the world of the screen and the world of which the screen is only a part (*DS* 144) (thus, enunciation, as one can guess, would really be in an in-between, it would have a foot in the world[33]); but two pages earlier, Casetti reminded us that the empirical YOU is definitively out of the reach of the film. It is true, but then what about the interfacial YOU? (The author has in fact an acute awareness of the uncomfortable and "interstitial" aspect of the pragmatic undertaking as a whole [see *DS* 24].)

Another perhaps superfluous precision. I don't pretend here that enunciative configurations are deprived of any influence on the observable behavior of the spectators (this hypothesis is as improbable as that of its unmistakable determination by the film). But in order to measure this influence, you must again go and see, that is, get out of the text.

Cinematic enunciation is always enunciation on the film. Reflexive, rather than deictic, it does not give us any information about the outside of the text, but about a text that carries in itself its source and its destination. Edward Branigan considers that in fictional films, narration is a metalanguage with respect to what is being narrated (*PV* 3).

Two conversing friends exchange the I and the YOU, according to the physical reality of their speaking turns; the film "speaks" alone all the time, it does not allow me to say anything and it cannot get out of itself (it was made before, once and for all). When the filmmaker appears on the screen, as Hitchcock does in his films— deictic and reflexive figure at the same time, as it seems—it is not, to take up another remark by Branigan (see *PV* 40), a filming Hitchcock that we can see, an author/filmmaker ("external" instance), but a filmed Hitchcock, a character, a little piece of film: metafilmic construction (since, on the other hand, we still recognize the film-maker). The time always comes, the same book insists, when the film cannot reveal the conditions of its birth and touches upon an "apersonal component" (*PV* 40; see also 172) (beautiful expression; it is the film as a thing, once again). Branigan also comments on the famous title lines of *Tout va bien* by Godard (see *PV* 172), where we see hands signing checks (thus, the filmmaker wanted to show the role of money in film production, and especially in his own): for the American analyst—he is pitiless but right, unlike those who fancy that it is *really* possible to "show the apparatus"—these images that were supposed to be revolutionary are still an ordinary scene

in the movie, since the act that shows them to us is not shown. To put it in more general (and simplistic) terms, we could say that without the help of a mirror the camera is unable to film itself— it is like our eyes, which we do not see—and that the so-called outside of the text can therefore be only text, reduplicated text, metatext.

The textual enclosure of cinematic enunciation is even clearer in common and, so to speak, anonymous figures. Thus, when someone tells us, as often happens, that in the "first person on the sound track," in voice-over, the enunciator has provisionally borrowed the voice of one of the protagonists, this person only describes some strange ballet in which all the terms belong to the film: enunciated mark of the enunciator (see Casetti), "voice" of a character, presence of an explicit narration, and so on—one example among many of the various metadiscursive twists which constitute cinematic enunciation by folding the different instances of the film over each other, in the exact same manner that there are several ways to fold a napkin.

The source and the target, considered in their literal inscription, in their discursive identity, are not roles, but *parts of text,* aspects or configurations of the text (that is how we notice the shot-reverse shot in the general organization of a sequence of images). Source and target are rather *orientations,* vectors in a textual topography, more abstract instances than is usually said.

The source is the text as a whole, seen from its origin to its end, in the ideal downstream order in which it is woven; in Casetti's book, it is one of the film's directions, "the film in the process of *being made.*" The destination is the same text countercurrent from its ending point, being undone and freed in imagination: it is the moment of *"being given"* in Casetti.[34]

Casetti gives once or twice the example of a famous scene in *Gone with the Wind* (see, for example, *DS* 69–71): a spectacular and emphasized back-traveling "abandons" Scarlett in the middle of the corpses and wounded bodies lying on the ground, just after the battle of Atlanta. According to the author, this camera motion figurativizes both how the scene is constructed (enunciator) and how it wants to be read (addressee). We could say the same thing about any shot, but it is true. However, to switch from one of those figurativizations to the other, one has to turn the text over and watch it from the other side, even if it is to obtain two perfectly parallel constructions. (After all, the reader does not, in theory, decipher anything else than what the inscriber wrote, but their

respective actions are oriented in opposite directions.)

Another case: subjective images. According to Casetti, the enunciator plays a slight role and the addressee, on the contrary, is very much highlighted, since he is "syncretized" with a concrete character, through whose very eyes we see what we see, and who is therefore, like the addressee, a watcher (see *DS* 75). That is beyond doubt. But it is also true, if you turn over the text, that the enunciator regains his importance, in that the source is "figurativized" in a character who is not only a watcher (as the spectator), but also someone who shows, like the filmmaker who stands behind him. This character has one eye in front and one eye in back, he receives rays from both sides, and the image can be perceived in two different ways, as in some drawings in which form and background can be inverted.

Casetti shows that he is very sensitive to the profound cause of these phenomena of reversion, although he does not comment separately on them. The "point of view" in the film, he stresses (*YY* 81–82), can be the place of the camera or that of the spectator— both can coincide but cannot be confused—so that enunciation is, from the beginning on, divided between *showing* and *seeing*. I shall add, in a psychoanalytical perspective, that primary identification with the camera has the effect of transforming it into a retroactive delegate of the spectator to come (André Gaudreault has commented well on this notion[35]), and that the projective/introjective qualities of this machine, recorder as well as pointed weapon, make it as ambivalent as the view itself, about which it is impossible to say whether it is active or passive, since it both receives and enlightens. Hence a symmetry, a *reversibility* of source and target, of which I gave a few examples, and which is probably responsible for the theoretical recourse to deictics, which are also reversible in language. But these two forms of reversibility are quite different, even if the French language does not have two words to distinguish them: in one case, signifiers physically exchange their location and actually start moving; in the other case, the spectator or the analyst reverses his perspective without touching anything.

Another striking example: the camera-gaze I have mentioned. It is of course a figure of the target; the destination provisionally coincides with the location of the camera (since the latter is being looked at), and it seldom happens that the reception instance of the film is solicited in such an explicit way, that is, that the spectator is directly addressed by a diegetic intervention. But this construction also highlights the source, which is, for now, clearly figured by the eyes of the observing character. The source follows and duplicates

the vector of this look. Having noticed this, Casetti thinks the I has created an interlocutor for himself (hence the strong presence of the YOU), while taking advantage of this situation to assert itself (see *DS* 143). This is the outline for a novella, whose characters would play tricks on one another, look for psychic benefits, and so on. In fact, if the spectator, whether real or imaginary, and the analyst (always considered real), "turn" the text "over" the way the diegetic onlooker does, the latter serves as a source, but also as a target, for he is under the fire (!) of the camera. And if you mentally orient the text the same way as the camera, this camera then becomes the target of the observer, and, nevertheless, being camera, that is, source, brings this look into existence.

This does not mean that figures of enunciation are all reversible. If I have insisted on those which are, it is to highlight both the abstract and textual (perceptive) character of those "locations" I call source and target. They are not the enunciator and the addressee, who are fictitious people; they are not even exactly things; they are—as the chosen word would like to suggest—directions (belonging to the geography of the film), orientations discovered by the analyst. For it is true, in a way, that the film's activity all happens between two poles, or two plots: there are by necessity makers and watchers, whatever name they are given. But when they are marked at a precise point in the film, what is important is to describe the layout of this imprint that is yet depersonalized and transformed into a landscape. Even when the filmmaker addresses us with the off-voice of a person, of an anonymous and overhanging commentator, the result in the text is a vocal one-way crossing that has this profound organ as a source, and, since there are no target "markers" (if one assumes the absence of any diegetic audience), that disseminates on the entire surface of the image, covering it as a coating.

Contrary to the previous figures, this one is not reversible, it marks the source and it alone: the "movement" of the voice only makes sense (if I may say so) in one sense, and there is no way to turn over the text, since there is no coherent construction in which an off-voice would be the target. Nonreversible figures are numerous and common. Among them, of course, all cinematic addresses (in, off, semi-diegetized, on written text in silent movies, and so on). Likewise—without claiming to be exhaustive—the "irreal objective" framings already mentioned, which are noticeably deforming but cannot be attributed to a character and therefore correspond to a direct intervention by the author (these images were sometimes called "author-subjectives" in film theory of the twenties and thirties).

Classical and often-quoted example (with special astuteness by Fran-
çois Jost[36]): systematic low-angle shots by Orson Welles. Here, the
notion of orientation can be understood in its almost literal sense,
since the enunciation marker consists of the image's unusual co-
efficient of gradient. A work's "manner" is a perpetual commentary
on what the work says. This commentary is not developed. On the
contrary, it is *wrapped* in the image. It is the incompressible coefficient
of enunciative intervention, and the birth act of the metatextual
gesture, yet still half stuck in what it will soon designate. To come
back to source and target, I want only to say that they always consist
of perceptible (audio-visual) movements and positions, or, rather,
of reference points that allow the description of these movements
and positions.

The kind of validity that is proper to textual studies of enunciation
could, to a certain extent, be compared to that characterizing semio-
psychoanalytic research. In both cases, if you assume that the analyst
has the necessary training (knowledge, method), the whole value of
his work depends on his personal qualities, since he is at the same
time the scholar, and (together with the film), the very terrain of
the research. He may declare that the specific pleasure that arises
from the fictional film is due to a fetishistic splitting process, to a
mixture of belief and disbelief. There is no need to quiz these
people, who would be hard put to answer such questions. This is
a general, or, rather, a *generic* truth; it concerns THE spectator.
Anyone can find it within himself. It does not tell us—for instance—
if, in this or that person, belief clearly prevails over disbelief, and
if, in others, on the other hand, disbelief is dominant. There is no
contradiction. The generic observation retains its interest, superior,
I believe, to that of its variants or its local exceptions. However, in
order to draw the curve of these fluctuations, which are inseparable
from the "real spectators" coming on stage, the only suitable methods
are empirical ones, for the question that is then asked is empirical.
At this point, the generic spectator—like the addressee in pragmatics:
they are two analyst figures—has no longer much to say.

The content of these pages was a little cluttered. I shall now
attempt, finally, to put things in order. I shall distinguish six points,
which will hopefully clarify the matter.

(1) Taken globally, enunciation theory offers one weak point.
Whatever the theory may say at times, it tends, more or less, in
one phase or in one aspect of the analysis, to suppress the Author

and the Spectator by using various and picturesque substitutes: implicit, ideal, and so on. These substitutes lend themselves to eviction and are always "nonempirical" yet personalized. If it is true that you can always omit the "real author" (but only because his real work is available), it is impossible to forget the spectator. An imaginary spectator, as I said, but imagined as real and not different from the real-real spectator, except that, in order to know his reaction, you only make plausible suppositions, not factual verifications. In order to suggest any interpretation of a cinematic sequence, someone has to have seen it, you have to have seen it yourself. The imaginary spectator deserves his name because it is unclear whether he reflects the general attitude of others, the entire public, or of any specific audience; but at the same time, he is real in the person of the analyst (and only the analyst, most of the time). It is unlikely that enunciation theory could do without the Spectator, that is the "Receptor," whose figure is borrowed from a very different—and ritually repudiated—horizon, that of communication theory. Edward Branigan perceptively remarks that the thought of enunciation keeps in itself, despite its authentic autonomy, something of the scheme of communication (see *PV* 41). This "something" can be reduced by hunting down anthropomorphisms, but I don't think anyone is able to suppress it, for a "real" analyst has to see the film.

(2) The obvious symmetry of enunciator and addressee hides a fundamental dissymmetry. If a given figure in film is attributed to the enunciator, it is because the analyst (on the side of the addressee) so decided. If it is attributed to the addressee, it is, again, because the analyst said so. The entire film is viewed from the perspective of the addressee, which leads us back to the big powers of the— or, rather, of *a*—real spectator. Which is only normal, for we talk about screening, not filming. In any field, the posture of analysis causes such an imbalance. You have to be aware of it and not be fooled by misleading symmetrical words, and to see instead the permanent risk of various torsions, which should, as much as possible, be straightened out by an effort toward objectivization.

(3) I don't know if the words *enunciator* and *addressee* are really necessary ones, that is, if they designate something other than an imaginary author and spectator, or to be clearer, something else than the *image* of the author and the spectator. However, these words are convenient because of their visible kinship with "enunciation." In addition, they become necessary in the case of explicit enunciators, about whom I shall talk soon. In practice, *enunciator*

can of course be used to mean the author, without saying so, and *addressee* to anticipate gratuitously the reactions of the public. But no term is safe from such misuse.

The good thing about these lexical hesitations is that they emphasize that the often mentioned level of enunciation (in the singular) corresponds in fact to two different stages: a textual stage (the "markers"; source and target), and a personal stage (imaginary author and spectator, enunciator and addressee; this is the level of *attributions*: the marker is ascribed to someone).

(4) In films and books, *explicit enunciators* are to be found, such as storytellers, when the work is narrative. But since the work is not always narrative, we need a more general term: enunciators, whom the text itself presents as holding a discourse. On the screen, they are never extradiegetic in Gérard Genette's sense,[37] for here are the images, the seeing and hearing apparatus which cannot be ascribed to this enunciator. As soon as the source of the entire film, the equivalent of its extradiegetic narration is at stake, enunciation loses its enunciator (and therefore its addressee), even if a voice-over covers the whole and speaks in the first person, even a fortiori if there is no voice-over. This is because the voice itself, as André Gaudreault points out,[38] is accountable only for what it says. I would add that the voice *does not explain why there are images*. In other words, the explicit enunciators in the film are always embedded, whether they pretend they are not, or are openly that way, like the narrators of a metadiegesis.

In regard to fictional films and their source, David Bordwell prefers to speak of narration rather than narrator,[39] and Edward Branigan speaks of "activity without actor" (*PV* 48). In fact, if this body of images and sounds seems in a way *assembled* (= enunciation), it does not give the impression of this conscious, unitarian and continuous intervention, which imposes on everything the homogenous filter of a unique and familiar code, from which the ideal figure of an almost human character, such as, precisely, the enunciator, would emerge. Here again, I find myself close to certain of André Gaudreault's recent concerns.[40]

(5) One of the most permanent difficulties in this set of problems is that there are points (or lines) in the text which correspond in an obvious way, for a more or less long period of time, to the author or the spectator, and which are, however, part of the film like everything else: the so-called enunciation "markers" (which are rather general organizational forms). These markers owe their names to the fact that theoretically they can be located within the text, but too often they are looked at less in relation to the text than to the

entities they are the markers of, markers *of* the enunciator and *of* the addressee. I tried to introduce the apersonal words *source* and *target,* in order, so to speak, to reintegrate the markers in the cinematic flow, rejoining here in my own way Casetti's position on the same point.[41]

(6) All figures of enunciation consist in metadiscursive folds of cinematic instances piled on top of each other. In subjective framing, the gazing and at the same time showing character duplicates both the spectator and the camera. In "interpellation," the character sends us back our own gaze, which usually does not allow any reply. And so on. It is as if the film could manifest the production instance that it carries in itself and that carries it only by talking to us about the camera, the spectator, or by pointing at its own filmitude, that is, in any case, by pointing at itself. Thus, in places, a slightly sliding-off layer of film is constituted. It detaches itself from the rest and settles at once through this very folding that puts it, as it were, on a double lane on the register of enunciation.

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(Translated by Béatrice Durand-Sendrail
with Kristen Brookes)

NOTES

1   Francesco Casetti makes this remark in his article "Les yeux dans les yeux" (The eyes in the eyes), about which I will speak at length (see n. 6 for publication information). See Algirdas Julien Greimas and Joseph Courtés, *Sémiotique: Dictionnaire raisonné de la théorie du langage* (Paris, 1979), pp. 125–26.
2   See Gérard Genette, *Figures III* (Paris, 1972), p. 226. Genette grants the *narration* a status "parallel" (to use his own term) to the status of linguistic enunciation. The latter, he says, has to do mostly with the feature of "subjectivity in language," as Benveniste defined it.
3   I follow the terminology used by Catherine Parker in her translation of Tzvetan Todorov and Oswald Ducrot, *Dictionnaire des sciences encyclopédiques du langage* (Baltimore, 1979), except for *enonciateur,* which I translate by *enunciator.* Here is how the terminology of enunciation will be systematically translated in this paper:

Enonciateur:	Enunciator
Enonciataire:	Addressee
Enoncé:	Utterance

4   Albert Laffay, *Logique du cinéma (Création et spectacle)* (Paris, 1964), pp. 80–83.
5   Marc Vernet, "Clignotements du noir-et-blanc," in *Théorie du film,* ed. Jacques Aumont and Jean-Louis Leutrat (Paris, 1980), p. 232.
6   Especially in two texts, Casetti's article "Les yeux dans les yeux," in *Communications,* 38 (Paris, 1983), special issue on "Enonciation et cinéma," ed. Marc Vernet and Jean-Paul Simon, pp. 78–97; hereafter cited in text as *YY*; and his book *Dentro lo sguardo (Il film e il suo spettatore)* (Within the gaze [The film and its beholder]) (Milan, 1986); hereafter cited in text as *DS*.

7   See Emile Benveniste, "Les relations de temps dans le verbe français," *Bulletin de la Société de linguistique de Paris*, 54 (1959), 69–82, republished in his *Problèmes de linguistique générale* (Paris, 1966), I, pp. 237–50. On p. 242 the author introduces "discourse" after defining "narration"; he mentions above all the spoken language, and immediately afterwards, the written text that reproduces or imitates the spoken text (novels' dialogue, letter exchange, and so on).

8   See n. 7 concerning the written production that "imitates" speech situations; in the same passage, Benveniste adds that a significant amount of written texts happen to be in the same case.

9   See Gérard Genette, "Récit de paroles," in *Figure III*, pp. 189–203. Relating words is the only case where a literary text might operate by showing and no longer by telling, to quote the famous distinction by Anglo-Saxon critics. It only "copies" (p. 190), writes down the words it wants to report. (That is why, in the logic of Genette's conceptions, one cannot talk seriously anymore about narration (*récit*) at this point of the text.)

10   Benveniste, *Problèmes de Linguistique générale*, I, 239.

11   See *DS*: "enunciazione enunciata," p. 32; "enunciazione diegetizzata," p. 38; "presupposto," p. 40.

12   With of course the corresponding adjectives.

13   In English in the text.—tr.

14   Thus, for Benveniste, the definition of deictic words is that they organize the spatio-temporal in relationship to the I (those are therefore words whose signifier will change, the referent remaining the same). See Emile Benveniste, "De la subjectivité dans le langage," in *Journal de Psychologie normale et pathologique*, 3 (1958), 257–65; republished in *Problèmes de linguistique générale*, I, 258–66.

15   Not in all uses, for this example (see "I am going to sit at the right of the driver").

16   See Gianfranco Bettetini, *La conversazione audiovisiva (Problemi dell'enunciazione filmica e televisa)* (Milan, 1984); hereafter cited in text as *CA*.

17   See André Gaudreault, "Système du récit filmique," lecture given at the University of Paris-III, 25 March 1987, pp. 17–18.

18   See André Gardies, "Le vu et le su," in *Hors-Cadre*, 2 (Paris, 1984), special issue on "Cinénarrables," ed. Michèle Lagny, Marie-Claire Ropars, and Pierre Sorlin, pp. 45–64.

19   See André Gaudreault, p. 87 of "Narration et monstration au cinéma," in *Hors-Cadre*, pp. 87–98.

20   See David Bordwell, *Narration in the Fiction Film* (Madison, Wis., 1985), ch. 2, pp. 16–26.

21   Quoted after Gaudreault, "Système du récit filmique," pp. 3–4. On 26 Jan. 1983, in a letter to the review *Hors-Cadre* and 22 Feb. of the same year, in a letter to Gaudreault himself, Genette asserted that film narration does not, properly speaking, exist, since film *shows* us stories that have been reconstituted (constituted) for this purpose; there is only narration when facts are signified in written or oral language.

22   Pierre Sorlin, "A quel sujet?" in *Actes sémiotiques–Bulletin*, 10, No. 41 (1987), a special issue on "La Subjectivité au cinéma," ed. Jacques Fontanille, pp. 40–51. The two quoted sentences are on pp. 43 and 49 respectively.

23   See François Jost, "Discours cinématographique, Narration: deux façons d'envisager le problème de l'énonciation," in Aumont and Leutrat, pp. 121–31.

24   In a perspective broader than that of enunciative studies in the technical sense

of the word, the notion of "self-reflexivity in film" (where *self* seems to me redundant) has already been investigated in a very serious way by Reynold Humphries in Fritz Lang's American movies (*Fritz Lang, cinéaste américain* [Paris, 1980]), and also by a young Japanese scholar, Takeda Kiyoshi, in his analysis of theoretical writings of the twenties and thirties on film, in his thesis entitled *Archéologie du discours sur l'autoreflexivité au cinéma,* Paris, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1986.

25   See François Jost, *L'Oeil-Caméra—Entre film et roman* (Lyon, 1987), p. 32, and "Discours cinématographique, Narration"; and Jean-Paul Simon, *Le filmique et le comique* (Paris, 1979), p. 113. In this passage, Simon relies on some of my previous analyses (e.g., the tendency of grammatical markers to become part of the diegesis) in order to give them new developments.

26   See Dominique Chateau, "Vers un modèle génératif du discours filmique," in *Humanisme et enterprise,* 99 (1976), 2–4.

27   See Marc Vernet, "Regard à la caméra: figure de l'absence," *Iris,* 1 (1983), vol. 2 of special issue on "Etat de la Théorie/The State of Theory," ed. Jacques Aumont, Jean-Paul Simon, and Marc Vernet, pp. 39–40.

28   I made this point in 1964, in "Cinéma: langue ou langage?" in my *Essais sur la signification au cinéma* (Paris, 1968), but without connecting it specifically to the problem of enunciation. François Jost rethinks the problem in a more precise way in "Narration(s): en-deça et au delà," in Vernet and Simon, p. 195.

29   See Edward Branigan, *Point of View in the Cinema (A Theory of Narration and Subjectivity in Classical Film* (Berlin, 1984); hereafter cited in text as *PV.*

30   Thus, the "incorporeity" of enunciator and addressee, in that they can both be reduced to textual positions; Bettetini expresses the idea from the other side, and with more caution.

31   In English in the text.—tr.

32   Esp. in ch. 4, "La conversazione testuale," in *CA,* pp. 95 ff.

33   Francesco Casetti suggests several times in his book (pp. 20–21, 53–54, 57, 74, 145, 147, ff.), with both insistence and ambiguity, that the YOU would somehow be intermediary between the film and the world, that a constant come-and-go between the two would take place in the YOU. But in addition, the whole book correctly leaves the empirical spectator outside, so that one no longer sees who this mediator, that is both called for and rejected, could be. Bettetini, by contrast, reminds us very simply (but this is useful) that the receptor's reactions cannot modify the text, contrary to what happens in spoken exchanges (see *CA* 109).

34   In Italian "farsi" and "darsi"; see *DS* 44, 79 ff.

35   See Gaudreault, "Narration et monstration au cinéma," pp. 93.

36   See pp. 198–99 of Jost, "Narration(s): en deçà et au-delà," in Vernet and Simon, pp. 192–212.

37   That is fully accountable for the original narration, whether or not they are explicitly mentioned as characters; see Genette, *Figures III,* pp. 238–39.

38   See André Gaudreault, "Système du récit filmique," papier de travail, beginning of 1987. In the meantime, this article appeared in a revised form in an issue on "Texte et médialité" in *Mana,* ed. Jürgen E. Müller (Mannheim, 1987), pp. 267–78.

39   See Bordwell, *Narration in the Fiction Film,* pp. 61–62.

40   See Gaudreault, "Système du récit filmique." Between Gaudreault and myself, a quite rare phenomenon of crossed and almost simultaneous influence happened. He wrote the two "Système du récit filmique" while taking part in a seminar where I was developing ideas close to the ones expressed here, but he put them in a different setting and gave them new extension, so that I was myself led to borrow various theoretical elements from him.

41   With much talent and persuasive strength, Francesco Casetti shows his reader
the paradox of enunciation: whatever its tricks are, enunciation always remains
"offstage" (this is the author's expression), and it is only recognizable in the utterance.
It is difficult to think of this situation and, even more difficult, to forget it. See esp.
YY, p. 81.

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